

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Summary of Issues

Atoms for Peace After 50 Years

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I. HOW DID WE GET HERE AND WHAT DID WE LEARN

- **Eisenhower's vision:**
 - **Defense policy focused on deterrence (“massive retaliation, : “new look”)**
 - **Overestimated the importance of civil use of atomic energy in the 20th century.**
 - **Realistic about the prospects for proliferation, but thought it could be managed and enforced.**

FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- NWS

- **Appeal of nuclear weapons is enduring**
- **US role for nuclear weapons has contracted – further contraction with ACW**
- **Unique effects-based characteristics rather than area destruction required**
- **More complex political role: reassurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and retaliation.**
- **Higher order of integration of nuclear and ACW than in the Cold War.**

FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- NNWS

- **Cost of defeating ACW is a stimulus to nuclear weapons acquisition.**
- **Loss of links of to superpowers has contributed to regional proliferation.**
- **Future proliferation may be driven by 2nd tier NW states export needs (DPRK, Pakistan, Iran).**
- **Too soon to assess impact of pre-emption and missile defense on proliferation.**

II. WHERE ARE WE HEADED IN DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE?

- The range of 21st century requirements are more diverse, but stockpile size required is reduced.**
- Deterrence through retaliation is supplemented with other alternatives; missile defense, pre-emption, ACW.**
- Linking of systems-of-systems via IT parallel to transformation of ACW may produce “holistic” approach to NW.**

FUTURE TURNING POINTS

- **Successful nuclear use.**
- **Widespread nuclear proliferation via networked suppliers (3rd tier proliferation).**
- **Effective use of BW/CW.**
- **Use by a State without an adversarial relationship to the US**

PRE-EMPTION

- **Added tool to strengthen deterrence.**
- **Predominately ACW, not nuclear apart from a few specialized scenarios.**
- **Requires a high order of global C4ISR integration for implementation.**
- **Adaptive behavior by proliferators not identified.**

MISSILE DEFENSE

- **Near/medium term impact of missile defense likely to be low.**
- **Effective missile defense could have significant consequences.**
- **Adaptive tactics of mixed BM/CM force makes missile defense more complex.**
- **Effective missile defense could affect the nuclear decision of marginal proliferators.**

NW MODERNIZATION

- **Utility of current stockpile is limited; too focused on area effects.**
- **Understanding of low yield weapon effects is poor – complicates addressing new target sets.**
- **More research needed on the role of the unique characteristics of NW vs. ACW to address new target sets.**

III. WHERE ARE WE HEADED IN NON-PROLIFERATION?

- **Is the threat of proliferation too great to develop civil nuclear power?**
- **Could the risks be mitigated by:**
 - **New proliferation-resistant designs?**
 - **Better practices with LW reactors to secure spent fuel?**
 - **Limiting or banning reprocessing?**
 - **Fuel leasing or ownership arrangements?**
 - **Other measures?**

NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY

- Is the universal approach of the NPT a viable basis for NP strategy?**
- Problems created by individual states or (with or w/o links to terrorism) call for individual solutions.**
- NP is an important but not dominant US foreign policy objective, hence inconsistent implementation history.**

NEW TOOLS FOR NP

- **More effective inspections**
- **Tailored security assurances beyond a universal regime**
- **Modernized global or regional security architecture**
- **International missile defense**

IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

- **Campaign in Iraq may provide useful data on the nature of proliferation and new approaches to the problem.**
- **US statement to DPRK and Iran to “notice” the lessons of Iraq.**
- **Will proliferation become universally proscribed behavior?**